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This chapter updates and extends ideas developed over years in collaboration with deep-thinking friends. 
In particular I aim to update and extend the chapter on hate by Royzman, McCauley, and Rozin that 
appeared in The Psychology of Hate, edited by Sternberg (2005). 
The first section reviews four ways of getting to the meaning of hate, ending with proposed definitions of 
hate and love as extreme forms of identification with individuals or groups. In these definitions, hate 
includes perception of a negative essence, and love includes perception of a positive essence (Royzman, 
McCauley, & Rozin, 2005).  
The second section stipulates a definition of identification and provides examples of the power of positive 
and negative identification in human affairs. This section draws on a chapter about the power of ethnic 
nationalism commissioned by Dan Chirot (McCauley, 2001).  
The third section reviews ideas about what it means to essentialize a category; research shows the ease 
with which humans essentialize living things, including human individuals and groups. This section 
profits by ill-fated research with Paul Rozin in which we tried to find measures that would show Japanese 
more essentialized than Americans. Belatedly we recognized that Americans essentialize Americans 
almost as easily as they essentialize Japanese.   
The fourth section explores positive and negative essence as perceived in human individuals and groups. 
This section draws on a typology of motives for mass political murder (Chirot & McCauley, 2006) to 
show that perception of a contaminating essence is an economical way to understand the dehumanization 
and disgust often directed at victims of genocide.  
The concluding section points to research directions implied by the stipulated conceptions of hate and 
love, ending with brief overview of how these conceptions relate to previous views of intergroup 
emotions, dehumanization, and motives for mass murder.   
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FOUR WAYS OF THINKING ABOUT HATE 
In their review of ideas about hate, Royzman, McCauley, and Rozin (2005) identified four ways of 
thinking about the meaning of hate.  This section will review and update the four ways of getting to a 
definition of hate. 
Platonic Ideal Definition 
This approach assumes that there is an objective right answer to the question “What is hate?’ just as there 
is an objective right answer to the question “What is gold?”  If there is one “true,” “real,” or “essential” 
meaning of hate, then understanding hate means divining a Platonic Form only vaguely seen by others; 
research must get past approximations to uncover the “gold-standard” definition analogous to atomic 
number 79 as the definition of gold. 
A Platonist example is psychiatrist Willard Gaylin: “We are capable of transient extremes of rage that we 
call hatred, but the true haters live daily with their hatred…They are obsessed with their enemies, attached 
to them in a paranoid partnership. It is this attachment that defines true hatred” (2003, pp. 4-5).  Here 
Gaylin opposes everyday use of the word hatred with “true” hatred, a relationship marked by paranoid 
obsession.  The true meaning of hate can only be seen through the lens of psychiatry and psychiatric 
concepts. 
Perhaps most people, expert and layperson alike, slip into a Platonist mode in trying to define something, 
especially when trying to say why one definition is better than another. This mode of argument does not 
by any means block useful insights. Despite his Platonic aspirations, Gaylin does at one point 
acknowledge the normal psychology that is the basis of hate: “Hatred is an extreme and perverse 
distortion of the necessary process of group identification” (p.171). Indeed a version of this idea appears 
later in this chapter. 
But the Platonist search for the “true” meaning of hate is better resisted. It is not likely that hate, and 
presumably every psychological concept, has an ideal meaning that can survive over time and cultural 
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change. Worse yet, arguments over the true meaning of hate do not lead easily to falsifiable predictions 
about the origins or consequences of hate, or about how to measure it.   
Definition by Usage 
Investigating common usage has been perhaps the most popular way of looking for the meaning of hate. 
This approach has two variants: usage by experts and usage by everyman. Both assume that a substantive 
consensus can be identified. 
At the beginning of expert opinion, Aristotle famously defined hate and distinguished it from anger.  The 
distinction is important since many have noticed that there is considerable overlap in the actions 
associated with hate and anger: both aim to bring bad things to their target.   
Aristotle says that anger is the reaction to undeserved slight (also rendered as perceived injustice), and 
that the target of anger is the person perpetrating the slight. There has been some disagreement about 
whether Aristotle meant to exclude group perpetrators of slight, but as he mentions that slight to our 
family and friends can make us angry, there is at least an argument that Aristotle would recognize that the 
target of anger might be groups (their family and friends) who slighted our group (family and friends) 
(Christiansen, 2016). 
Hate is unlike anger, according to Aristotle, because hate is not a reaction to a particular slight but a 
reaction to bad character revealed in a history of bad action. Not only individuals can be hated; groups 
and classes of people can be hated, even if they have done nothing to us personally. Everyone hates a 
thief or a sycophant, says Aristotle. Hate is also unlike anger in its desires. Whereas hate wishes bad 
things to happen to the hated, or that they cease to exist, anger wishes revenge--pain inflicted on the 
perpetrator of a slight by the one slighted.  
In their contribution to Sternberg’s (2005) edited volume, The Psychology of Hate, Royzman, McCauley, 
and Rozin (2005) reviewed expert opinions about hate but found little agreement.  Indeed contributors to 
the 2005 volume were also far from agreement, as summarized in the next paragraph.  
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Sternberg (2003) originally advanced a three-component theory of hate that includes disgust, anger/fear, 
and contempt. Staub (2005) saw hate as a complex emotion that includes fear and anger associated with 
perception of threat from the hated other. Beck and Pretzer (2005) did not offer a definition of hate but 
described it as a persistent response to persistent perception of being “wronged, damaged, coerced or 
corrupted” (p.73). Baumeister and Butz (2005) did not offer a definition of hate but assumed that factors 
leading to interpersonal and intergroup violence (material reward, threatened egotism, idealism, sadism) 
also lead to hate. Lerner, Balsano, Banik, and Naudeau (2005) operationalized hate as an instance of 
negative prejudice marked by high emotional arousal and salience. Opotow (2005) described hate as 
extreme enmity and pointed to moral exclusion as the key to expressing enmity in violence.  Berkowitz 
(2005) focused, not on hate, but on haters; he explored what personal and situational factors might explain 
how some haters turn to aggression against the hated. Moshman followed Aristotle in seeing anger as a 
momentary reaction, whereas hatred is “an enduring attitude directed at persons” (2005, p.186); he 
showed that perpetrators of mass killing have many motives besides hate. Dovidio, Gaertner, and Pearson 
considered hate as “extreme dislike associated with prejudice that produces aggressive impulses” (2005, 
p.212) and focused mostly on when aversive racism may turn to blatant racism and hatred.  Finally, 
Alford’s (2005) chapter pointed to the psychic rewards of hate, including the fraternity of those who hate 
together. 
The diversity of opinions about hate among these experts is striking.  For some, hate is an emotion or 
collection of emotions. Others see hate as a negative attitude or prejudice. Some relate hate to love, and 
others do not. Some try to consider both interpersonal and intergroup hate; others focus only or mostly on 
one of these. Some discuss hate as the explanation of mass killing; others recognize that most haters never 
move to violent action and point to the importance of dehumanization or moral exclusion for 
understanding mass killing. Some are more concerned with where hate comes from—antecedents of hate 
such as threat and injury--than what it is. 
Essence of Hate and Love   6 
 
If the experts cannot agree, it should be no surprise that studies of lay usage do not produce consensus 
either. Royzman, McCauley, and Rozin (2005) reviewed studies of this kind, and what commonality 
could be found in descriptions elicited from everyman did not agree with expert opinion. Lay usage in 
describing personal experience of hate, for instance, seems to focus on humiliation by a superior against 
whom revenge or even expression of anger is too dangerous to contemplate. But status asymmetry of 
haters and hated is not salient in expert discussions of hate.  
It is worth noting that lay-usage studies ask about interpersonal hate; hate for large groups and classes 
may be seen as politically incorrect and self-report studies thus untrustworthy, at least in Western 
countries. 
Ostensive Definition 
A third approach to the meaning of hate is definition by example. This approach is represented in 
discussions that provide vivid examples of mass killing but no definition of hate or hatred. Hate, then, is 
what these examples have in common, in particular what is common in the motivations of mass killing.  
As already noted, some contributors to the Psychology of Hate (Sternberg, 2005) did not attempt to define 
hate; they pointed to hate with examples.  Three popular books about hate--Modern Hatreds (Kaufman, 
2001), Fires of Hatred (Naimark, 2001) and Mass Hate (Kressel, 2002)--do not offer any definition of 
hate or hatred;  indeed, hate does not even appear in the indices of the books by Kaufman and Naimark. 
Instead, these books describe genocides and mass murders in which hate is presumed to have played a 
causal role. It is worth noticing that Kressel, like Moshman (2005), recognizes that perpetrators of mass 
killing can have many individual motives that do not depend on hate (fear of disobeying, material reward, 
status and power; Kressel, 2002, pp. 168, 224, 236). 
One weakness of trying to work backwards to hate from instances of mass killing is that interpersonal 
hate is left behind.  Studies of mass killing cannot tell us whether there is such a thing as interpersonal 
hate, or, if so, whether it is the same as mass hate or something importantly different.  
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A related weakness is that studies of mass killings may tell us something about the antecedents of hate, 
understood as a cause of mass killing, but cannot tell us what hate is. Efforts to measure hate, as opposed 
to the psychological trajectory that ends in hate, can have little support from ostensive definitions of hate.  
Stipulated Definition 
A stipulated definition of a concept does not depend on finding agreement in use of a name for the 
concept, or on agreement about the commonality in instances said to show the concept at work.  Rather, a 
stipulated definition is the beginning of an empirical research project.  If we define hate--or love, or 
anger—in a particular way, then what useful measures and relationships are we led to? 
Stipulated definitions are the foundation of psychology as a science.  A useful definition of a 
psychological concept should do two things.  First, it should demarcate a domain sufficiently 
homogenous to support advances in understanding the causes and effects of that domain (“carve nature at 
its joints”). And second, it should distinguish the concept from other related concepts. These two kinds of 
usefulness correspond at least roughly to the issues of convergent and discriminant validity advanced by 
Cook and Campbell (1979).  
There can be more than one stipulated definition for the same concept, and stipulated definitions of the 
same concept can change over time. Frustration was first defined in animal learning as an instigation to 
aggression resulting from a blocked goal response, but later came to be understood as instigation to 
aggression (anger) caused by any noxious experience. The expansion of the definition was motivated by 
expansion of the frustration-aggression hypothesis to include economic stress (low cotton prices) as a 
cause of lynching (Hovland & Sears, 1940). Similarly, dissonance was originally defined as a ratio of 
dissonant to consonant cognitions about an attitude object but ended up understood as self-justification 
after committing to a sleazy or stupid action (Sabini, 1995). 
Royzman, McCauley, and Rozin (2005, pp. 6-8) reviewed a number of stipulated definitions of hate, most 
offered by well-known psychologists. As already noted in relation to contributions to The Psychology of 
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Hate (Sternberg, 2005), differences of opinion tended to arise around whether hate is an emotion or 
something more enduring (syndrome or disposition) and around whether hate includes emotions of anger, 
fear, disgust, and contempt. Here I want to focus on a promising definition of hate advanced by Shand 
(1914).   
Shand (1914) begins by considering the meaning of love. He quotes philosophers (Descartes, Spinoza, 
Hume, Spencer) who claim that love is a single emotion, or at most a single feeling compounded of 
multiple emotions. Then he contrasts this claim with poetic descriptions of love (Chaucer, Shakespeare, 
Swift, Coleridge) that include experiences of multiple emotions: joy and sorrow, fear and hope, anger and 
gratitude. Shand sides with the poets.  He concludes that “Love, therefore, cannot be reduced to a single 
compound feeling; it must organize a number of different emotional dispositions capable of evoking in 
different situations the appropriate behavior” (p. 56). 
As Sternberg projects a theory of hate from his theory of love (see, e.g., Sternberg, 2006), so Shand 
(1914) analyzes hate as the opposite of love.  Both are dispositions or organizations of emotional 
experience in relation to the fortunes of the one loved or hated.  
The health and prosperity of the loved object is a cause of joy: in hatred, it is a cause of bitter 
sorrow.  In place of the delight in being again with the one we love, is a peculiar mixture of 
repugnance and anger when we find ourselves again in the presence of one we hate; the one 
impelling us to avoid the person, the other to attack him. … Thus the joy of hate is opposite to the 
joy of love, being caused by the suffering, loss of power and reputation of the hated person; and 
the sorrow of hate is opposite to the sorrow of love, and is caused by his power, reputation, and 
happiness. While, too, in love we fear those things that threaten suffering, injury, or destruction to 
the object, in hate we fear those events that threaten to preserve it from suffering and final 
destruction. In place, too, of the anger in defence of the object, there is anger toward those who 
defend it. (Shand, 1914, p.59) 
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Shand points in particular to emotions of joy, sorrow, anger, fear, and repugnance as occasioned by love 
and hate; these are indeed the emotions most often associated with discussions of hate. Although Shand 
focused on love and hate for individuals, his idea that love and hate are occasions of emotion, depending 
on what is happening to those loved or hated, can be applied to groups as well as to individuals. Indeed, 
Shand refers briefly to “hatred of the capitalist and professional classes by the manual laborers” (p. 58), 
suggesting that his idea can be applied to large groups, including national, ethnic, and political groups.  
In the remainder of this chapter I forward an updated version of Shand’s idea by stipulating that hate is an 
extreme form of negative identification that includes perception of a bad essence. Along the way, I 
stipulate also that love is an extreme form of positive identification that includes perception of a good 
essence.  The next section begins exploring hate and love by stipulating the meaning of positive and 
negative identification and providing some examples. 
POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE IDENTIFICATION 
In an earlier essay (McCauley, 2001), I tried to understand the mobilizing power of ethnic nationalism. 
My analysis began with the idea that nationalism is a form of group identification, which led me to a 
definition and discussion of identification that I summarize here. Most generally, I stipulate that 
identification means caring about what happens to others.  It means emotional response to the positive 
and negative outcomes of others, both individuals and groups.   
Positive Identification 
Positive identification is not the same as empathy, which is feeling what others feel. Identifying with a 
screen character unaware of an approaching monster occasions fear and dread, not the blissful ease of the 
character.  It is not the same as sympathy, which is feeling sorry for others. Identification can occasion 
positive emotions when the one identified with is succeeding or prospering.  It does not mean losing sight 
of self-interest; rather, it means caring enough about another to sacrifice self-interest. Identification with a 
needy sibling can occasion pity and a loan, but neither pity nor loan blocks awareness of the bank debit. 
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Thus understood, identification is a major piece of human psychology. We identify most obviously with 
families and friends, with teammates and co-workers. Caring about those close to us is easy to explain as 
self-interest or even evolutionary interest. But we often care about people whose link to our own welfare 
is somewhere between mysterious and nugatory: princesses and actresses, fictional characters from print 
and screen, sports teams and sports heroes. We care about our pets: people have refused to escape a flood 
if their dog or cat cannot get in the boat with them. We care about groups we are not part of: victims of 
disease or disaster for whom we send money or volunteer our time.  
Only slightly less mysterious is caring about common-interest groups we are part of: millions of strangers 
composing our ethnic, national, religious, or occupational group. For these groups the free-rider problem 
should rationally lead us to put self-interest first—but sacrifices for such groups are common and form the 
foundation of political power for these groups. It appears that we do not need self-interest to care about 
others; instead we seem eager to pour ourselves into others—human and animal, fictional and real, 
individual and collective. 
If the origins of identification can seem mysterious, the effects are far from imaginary. In one study of the 
physiological power of identification, saliva samples were obtained from fans at a sports bar before and 
after the 1994 World Cup soccer match between Brazil and Italy. Brazil won and Brazil fans showed a 20 
percent increase in testosterone; Italy fans showed a 20 percent decrease (Bernhardt, Dabbs, Fielden & 
Lutter, 1998). 
Negative Identification 
So far, I have summarized a view of positive identification. There is also negative identification, which, 
like positive identification, means caring about both individuals and groups. But negative identification is 
inverse caring, in which we feel negative emotions when the hated is prospering and feel positive 
emotions when the hated is failing.  A child may feel joy if the bully who takes his lunch every week 
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meets a bigger bully who takes his lunch. Some baseball fans feel joy when the Yankees lose, and sadness 
if they win.  
Negative identification is an important force in politics.  In an October 2016 poll of registered US voters, 
41 percent of those planning to vote for Hillary Clinton said that their vote was more against Donald 
Trump than for Clinton; 51 percent of those planning to vote for Trump said their vote was more against 
Clinton than for Trump (Pew Research Center, 2016).  The rise of ‘negative voting’ appears to be an 
aspect of growing partisanship in Western countries, such that negative feelings toward them and their 
candidate are more important that positive views of our candidate (Abramowitz & Webster, 2016). 
In short, negative identification is a modern instantiation of Shand’s view of hate as an organization of 
emotional responses relating to the fortunes of the hated. Negative identification means just the kind of 
inverse caring that Shand described.  
But negative identification is not the same as hate.  The definition stipulated is that hate is an extreme 
form of negative identification that includes a negative essence.  Similarly, the stipulated definition of 
love is an extreme an extreme form of positive identification that includes a positive essence. The next 
section aims to make clear the meaning of essence in this context.  
THE IDEA OF ESSENCE 
As for the concept of identification, my treatment of essence must be a brief version of an important area 
of psychology. More detail is available in Why Not Kill Them All? (Chirot & McCauley, 2006).   
As already noted, Plato advanced a theory that to know a thing is to know its Ideal Form or essence, 
which cannot be learned from experience but only remembered from a life before birth.  Aristotle 
distinguished the essence of a thing from its accidents, an idea developed by Thomas Aquinas to 
understand how the Catholic Eucharist could have the essence of the Body and Blood of Christ under the 
accidents (appearances) of bread and wine. These examples demonstrate that ideas of essence go far back 
in human history. 
Essence of Hate and Love   12 
 
For a living thing, its essence is the hidden something that makes it what it is. The closest example of 
essence is the self. My essence is whatever it is inside me that makes me the same person today as when I 
was five years old.  I cannot tell you what the something is—somehow it is more than history—but I am 
confident that I am the same person despite radical changes in appearance and behavior. Modern biology 
would say that my genes have not changed, and that these genes set the boundaries of the trajectory of 
development from five-year old to adult. But perception of self did not wait for modern biology, and my 
five-year-old sense of self did not require any knowledge of genetics.  
Others also have essences.  Others see me as having an essence just as they see themselves as having an 
essence. Each individual is seen to have an essence that is referred to in different times and places as 
identity, character, personality, spirit, soul, or nature. Not only human individuals have essences. My dog 
Mugsy has an essence that distinguishes him from other dogs. My cat Shoesy has an essence that 
distinguishes him from other cats. 
Importantly for understanding of hate, groups of living things are also seen to have essences.  A three-
legged albino tiger is still a tiger because it has still the essence of tiger somehow inside it. This kind of 
essentialist thinking is a developmental milestone (Keil, 1989). 
Before the age of four or five, American children say that an animal is what it looks like. They will say  
that a skunk with its hair cut and dyed to look like a cat is really a cat, or that a cat made to look like a 
skunk is really a skunk. But older children will say that a cat is a cat, and a skunk is a skunk, no matter 
how its appearance is changed. If asked why it is still a cat, or a skunk, despite changed appearances, 
children look puzzled and hesitate, perhaps coming up with some kind of protobiological explanation 
about how if the cat had babies, they would still be baby cats. The same experiment repeated in Africa 
records the same transition at the same age, but the explanation differs. The dik-dik remains a dik-dik 
despite looking like a gazelle because it still has the spirit of the dik-dik (Keil, 1989). 
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Research shows that children show an essentialist bias in developing concepts and causal explanations of 
many different kinds (Gelman, 2005a; 2005b), including concepts of racial categories (Hirschfeld, 1996). 
Children are not taught essentialism by their parents; the essentialist bias seems to arise spontaneously. 
In an effort to be more specific about what it means to essentialize, Haslam, Rothschild and Ernst (2000) 
had undergraduates rate a variety of human social categories on nine elements often associated with the 
idea of essence. Two dimensions of essentializing emerged. Birth-determined categories (e.g. Female, 
Asian) were seen as having discrete boundaries, necessary characteristics, immutable membership, and 
stability over time. Choice-determined categories (e.g., Homosexual, Liberal) were seen as having similar 
and predictable members who are “basically the same beneath surface similarities and differences.”  
Labeled “inherence” by Haslam et al, “basically the same beneath surface similarities” is almost a 
definition of the concept of essence. It is surprising that this key element was not associated with birth-
determined categories, Instead inherence clustered with similarity and predictability in the dimension that 
distinguished choice-determined categories. The meaning of this surprise remains unclear but it should 
alert us to the possibility that humans do not have conscious access to what drives perceptions of essence. 
History tells us that ideas of essence have been with us a long time. Research tells us that children show 
an early and spontaneous bias toward essentialist thinking in developing concepts and causal 
explanations. So it seems likely that perception of essence is somehow biologically prepared, but perhaps 
no more accessible in consciousness than our biologically prepared perception of color.  Colors are not 
out there, only a continuous spectrum of radiation that our brain turns into the discontinuities of color 
bands. Similarly, animal species are not out there, at least not with a million-year perspective, but our 
brain divides the living world into essentialized categories. 
Thus, despite burgeoning research, there is considerable disagreement about the nature and origins of 
human essentializing. Some believe that the brain module for essentializing animal groups is put to work 
essentializing human groups. Some believe that there is a separate brain module for essentializing groups 
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of people. Some believe that brain modules for essentializing were shaped by specifiable evolutionary 
advantages; others doubt that there is a persuasive evolutionary story about human essentializing. These 
and many other debates about the nature and origins of human essentializing can be found in the 
Comments and Reply sections that follow Gil-White’s (2001) effort to show how ethnic groups are 
species to the human brain.  
Perhaps the greatest disagreement is about whether ideas of essence should be banned from social 
science.  A few scholars are bold enough to claim that humans are “natural-born essentialists,” with “a 
default assumption that things, people, and events have invisible essences that make them what they are” 
(Bloom, 2010; see also Gelman, 2005b). But the dominant view in social science is constructivism, 
according to which it is not useful to think of humans, as individuals or groups, as having fixed essences. 
Especially hegemonic is the constructivist view when applied to groups of people—ethnic groups, 
nations—where scholars have shown porous boundaries and instability over time that are inconsistent 
with the idea that these groups are natural kinds.   
It is a paradox that constructivists have won the academy while essentialists are found everywhere outside 
it. A generation of students have learned that essentialism is wrong in fact, but somehow persevere in 
essentialist beliefs outside the classroom.  
To understand hate and love, it is not necessary to take sides in these disputes or even to comprehend 
them in detail. It is only necessary to recognize that essentialism has a long and rich history in human 
thinking, and, whether justified or not as a matter of fact, is commonplace in perceptions of human 
individuals and groups. Returning to our stipulated definitions, the next section discusses ideas of positive 
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POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE ESSENCE 
There seems to be much more research on perceptions of bad, negative, or evil essence than on 
perceptions of good or positive essence. It is convenient, then, to begin with brief consideration of 
perceptions of positive essence. 
Positive Essence 
Obvious examples of the power of positive essence can be found in auction prices. A real Picasso, painted 
by the master’s own hand, is worth many times what even the most perfect copy can bring. An oak 
rocking chair used by President John Fitzgerald Kennedy sold at auction for over $400,000; a new 
rocking chair of the same design might be worth $1000. Something in contact with a famous person can 
take on a value consistent with the idea that a positive essence was imparted to the object; this is positive 
contamination. 
Turning from auction examples to research, a positive essence has been shown to be an important 
determinant of stability and change in individual identity. In a series of studies, De Freitas and his 
colleagues investigated what kinds of changes can lead to the perception that an individual’s identity has 
changed.  
Removing morally good traits leads to a larger sense of disruption to personal identity compared 
to other kinds of traits, including morally bad traits of an equal magnitude. Furthermore, beliefs 
about a good true self show various hallmarks of psychological essentialism. People believe that 
morally good traits are innate and cross-temporally stable, that there is a boundary separating the 
self-essence from other aspects of the self, and that self-essences have non-obvious properties and 
are diagnostic of what is true about an individual….To our minds, the most parsimonious 
interpretation of these various findings is that people believe that moral goodness is the 
fundamental quality that defines the person. Eliminate this quality, and you eliminate the person. 
(De Freitas, Cikara, Grossman, & Schlegel, 2018, p. 740)  
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De Freitas, Tobia, Newman, and Kinder (2016) have suggested that there are similarities in intuitions 
about individuals and categories. For both, characteristics seen as causal are more likely to be seen as 
essential, and normatively good characteristics are more likely to be seen as essential. Perhaps, they 
suggest, perception of positive essence works similarly for both individuals and categories, including 
categories of people often referred to as groups. 
A very different approach to positive essence began as studies of fusion, a deep feeling of oneness with 
another individual or group.  At the group level, fusion is measured with items such as “I am one with my 
country” and “My country is me” (Gomez et al, 2011). This kind of oneness includes a feeling that 
members of the group, even a group as large as a national or ethnic group, are like family. This is already 
a clue that fusion is linked with essentializing the group, as family and kin groups are often essentialized 
(Gil-White, 2001).   
In addition, Swann and Buhrmester (2015) report that: “Strongly fused persons are especially inclined to 
endorse pro-group action when either the personal or the social self is salient, when physiological arousal 
is high, or when they perceive that group members share essential qualities (e.g., genes, core values) with 
one another.”  
It is important that group action is encouraged for strongly fused persons when the personal self is made 
salient. This result means that personal identity is not lost in group identity, which is the understanding of 
identification earlier advanced in the section on Positive Identification. Also important is the observation 
that fusion supports pro-group action more when group members are seen to share essential qualities. It 
seems likely that fusion with either individuals or groups is associated with perception of a positive 
essence. Perhaps it is not too much to say that fusion with an individual or group is an expression of love. 
Negative Essence 
Perception of bad or evil essence in individuals seems to have been little studied.  A good place to begin 
would be the penalty phase of murder trials, in which the accused has already been judged guilty and a 
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separate proceeding determines whether the death penalty will be imposed. The prosecution argues for the 
death penalty by trying to show that the convicted individual is ‘bad to the bone’ and will always be a 
threat to society. The defense argues instead that there is some spark of goodness in the individual, some 
chance of redemption. In other words, the prosecution argues for bad essence and the defense argues 
against it. These arguments might illuminate the meaning of bad essence at the individual level. 
It is worth remarking that seeing a negative essence in an individual can be difficult to distinguish from 
seeing a negative group essence in an individual. “Several years after Keith Tharpe was sentenced to 
death for murder in 1991, a juror in his case signed an affidavit stating that there are two types of black 
people: good ones and ‘niggers.’ The juror, who was white, put the defendant in the latter category and 
said that he wondered “if black people even have souls” (Kennedy, 2019). 
At the group level, many scholars have pointed to the importance of dehumanization as encouraging or 
even necessary for perpetrating genocide and ethnic cleansing. Haslam (2006) reviews research offering 
several different views of dehumanization: excluding a group from moral status as human, denigrating a 
group’s values as selfish and animal-like, and denying that a group has more than animal emotions. 
Haslam integrates these views into a dual theory of dehumanization: animalistic dehumanization denies 
characteristics that separate humans from animals; mechanistic dehumanization denies characteristics 
associated with human nature, leaving an individual or group as object or automaton. 
Haslam suggests that animalistic dehumanization may occur primarily in intergroup conflict, whereas 
mechanistic dehumanization may occur at both individual and group levels. He also suggests that 
animalistic dehumanization is associated with emotions of disgust and contempt, whereas mechanistic 
dehumanization is associated with disregard and indifference. For understanding hate, with all its 
emotional power, it is animalistic dehumanization that is at issue.  
The key point for understanding hate is that animalistic dehumanization includes perception of a negative 
(animalistic) essence. “Essentialist thinking about groups—seeing them as discrete ‘natural kinds‘—does 
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appear to be necessary for animalistic dehumanization. Only if groups are believed to have categorically 
different natures can intergroup differences be seen as species-like” (Haslam, 2006, p. 259). 
As Haslam noted, the emotion often associated with animalistic dehumanization is disgust. The hallmark 
of disgust is contamination; even brief contact with a disgusting object can contaminate. Modern biology 
would say that contamination sensitivity is sensitivity to contact with germs and disease, but disgust came 
before germ theory and goes beyond germ theory, as when dipping even a sterilized cockroach into a 
glass of juice makes it undrinkable. The natural interpretation of contamination is that a bad essence has 
been passed from one object to another (Rozin, Haidt & McCauley, 2016).  
Consistent with this idea, targets of genocide and ethnic cleansing are often described with a limited 
number of animal epithets. The enemy is a virus or a bacillus—a disease and contamination threat.  They 
are lice, maggots, cockroaches, pigs, vultures—disgusting and contaminating in their association with 
offal, decay and death.  One could imagine animal epithets that are not contaminating: the enemy are 
bees, ladybugs, mice, rabbits, sheep, cattle, or canaries. These are familiar animals and calling the enemy 
by these names would name them animals--but not disgusting and contaminating animals. The common 
epithets convey not just an inferior animal essence, but a contaminating and disgusting essence. 
It is not only groups defined by perceived descent—families, ethnic groups, national groups—that can be 
perceived as sharing a bad essence. Stalin tried to exterminate the kulaks, a class of prosperous peasants. 
An even more striking example is the Cambodian genocide, where the predominant target was 
“Cambodians with Vietnamese minds.” These were seen as contaminating the authentic rural Cambodian 
culture. The perpetrators did not deny that their victims were Cambodian by blood descent but denied that 
they were “real” Cambodians.  It appears that any group perceived as self-reproducing can be 
essentialized, including class and cultural groups.  
Many observers have pointed to perceived threat as motive or justification for mass political murder, 
genocide, and ethnic cleansing. Drawing from this literature, Chirot and McCauley (2006) identified four 
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types of threat associated with killing by category. Material threat is perception that another group blocks 
our economic progress; the US removal of the Cherokee from their ancestral lands in 1838 is an example. 
Status threat is perception that another group has disrespected our superior status; anger and revenge are 
the likely response, as in 1904-05 when the German army killed or starved to death most of the Herero 
after this tribe overwhelmed a small German garrison in Southwest Africa. Existential threat is perception 
that it’s them or us; fear drives the violence, as happened in the mutual massacres and expulsions of Serbs 
and Croats in the 1990s. Fourth and finally, pollution threat is perception that another group is 
contaminating our ethnic, religious, or ideological purity; a well-known example is Hitler’s fear of Jewish 
pollution of the German volk.  
The four types of threat often overlap. Whites in the state of Georgia wanted Cherokee lands but were 
also disturbed by rising Cherokee education and prosperity and by beginnings of intermarriage between 
Cherokee and Whites.  That is, White Georgians felt not only material threat but status-inversion threat 
and pollution threat.  
If perception of animalistic and contaminating essence is required for mass killing, then perhaps pollution 
threat is not just one of several threats that can lead to genocide and ethnic cleansing. That is, perhaps 
pollution threat is the final common pathway by which material threat, status threat, and existential threat 
lead to mass killing.  This and related possibilities are considered in the next section. 
RESEARCH DIRECTIONS AND PREDICTIONS 
This chapter advances a stipulated definition of hate as an extreme form of negative identification that 
includes perception that an individual or group has a bad essence, especially a polluting bad essence. In 
parallel, love is stipulated as an extreme form of positive identification that includes perception that the 
loved individual or group has a good essence. As noted in the first section of this chapter, stipulated 
definitions are only as useful as the research directions and predictions that flow from them. In this 
section several domains of research are identified and some specific questions raised. 
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Hate and Love as Forms of Identification 
The first and greatest implication of the definitions of hate and love stipulated here is that hate and love 
are not emotions, but occasions of feeling many different emotions. It is not surprising to think that hate is 
associated with negative emotions, such as fear, anger, disgust and contempt toward the hated individual 
or group. More surprising is the prediction that positive emotions are associated with hate, including joy, 
happiness, and pride when the hated individual or group is losing or failing. 
Similarly, it is not surprising to think that love is associated with positive emotions, such as joy, hope, and 
pride. More surprising is the prediction that love is also associated with negative emotions, including fear, 
sadness, shame, and embarrassment when the loved one is losing or failing.  
The more surprising predictions about emotions associated with hate and love—negative emotions 
associated with love and positive emotions associated with hate—need to be tested.  Indeed, these 
predictions should be tested separately for hate and love for individuals, as well as for hate and love for 
groups. A beginning in this direction is research on schadenfreude, a shameful joy at another’s misfortune 
(Wang, Lilienfeld, & Rochat, 2019). According to Wang, "Dehumanization appears to be at the core of 
schadenfreude…The scenarios that elicit schadenfreude, such as intergroup conflicts, tend to also promote 
dehumanization." (Dodgson, 2018). 
Seeing hate and love as extreme forms of negative and positive identification is generally consistent with 
Intergroup Emotion Theory (Smith & Mackie, 2016), in which group identification is the basis of 
intergroup emotions. Smith and Mackie review evidence that positive identification with a group is 
correlated with positive ingroup emotions: individuals who identify more with the ingroup report more 
positive emotions (pride, happiness) relating to the ingroup. And more positive identification with a group 
is correlated with more anger toward a threatening outgroup.  
An easy prediction here is that more positive identification with an individual will similarly be correlated 
with more positive emotions relating to the loved one and more negative emotions relating to individuals 
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or groups threatening the loved one. Likewise, more negative identification with an individual should be 
correlated with more negative emotions when the hated one is prospering and more positive emotions 
when the hated one is failing. 
Relation of Individual and Group Levels 
As humans can care about both individuals and groups, we can experience emotions, both positive and 
negative emotions, in relation to what happens to individuals and groups we identify with. Positive 
identification (positive caring) and negative identification (inverse caring) can link us emotionally with 
both individuals and groups. Both individuals and groups can be perceived to have an essence; the 
essence can be positive or negative. Thus, the view of hate and love advanced in this chapter is symmetric 
with respect to positive and negative identification with individuals and groups, positive and negative 
emotions, and positive and negative essence. 
But can all this symmetry be found in real people? There are hints in the literature to the contrary. Recall 
that De Freitas, Tobia, Newman and Kinder (2016) found that, for individuals, normatively good 
characteristics are more likely to be seen as essential, and they went on to suggest that the same might be 
true of groups. A bias toward seeing positive characteristics as essential may be true for perceptions of 
ingroup individuals but seems unlikely to be true for perceptions of outgroups or outgroup individuals. It 
is possible that there is a bias toward perceiving positive essence for individuals, but a bias toward 
perceiving negative essence for outgroups. 
Another potential asymmetry has to do with the meaning of the emotions occasioned by hate and love. It 
is easy to say that we feel pride and joy when a loved individual or group is prospering and advancing, 
and that we feel negative emotions—fear, anxiety, sadness, shame—when the loved individual or group is 
fading or failing. And it is easy to reverse the emotional implications for hated individuals and groups, 
replacing emotions related to caring with emotions of inverse caring. But are emotions in relation to 
individuals we identify with really the same as emotions in relation to groups we identify with? And are 
Essence of Hate and Love   22 
 
emotions experienced via identification really the same as emotions occasioned by individual personal 
outcomes? 
When someone insults me, I feel anger. Is it the same experience of anger when someone insults an 
individual I identify with, my son perhaps? Is it the same experience of anger when someone insults a 
group I identify with, my nation perhaps?  
Writing about intergroup emotions, Smith and Mackie (2016) explicitly assume that these emotions are 
the same experience as individual emotions of the same name.  “...we assume that intergroup emotions are 
generally similar to individual-level emotions in the ways they are experienced; the effects they have on 
cognitive, perceptual and motor processes; and so forth…” (p.413). No research is cited in support of this 
assumption. 
The distinction between fear and anxiety suggests that experience of individual-level emotion may differ 
from experience of emotions occasioned by identification. LaBar (2016) expresses the distinction as 
follows. “Anxiety is a state of unease about a distal, potentially negative outcome that is uncertain or 
unpredictable… In contrast to fear, anxiety is longer lasting, is more future than present oriented, often 
has a less specific elicitor or terminator…and functionally prepares the organism to confront a threat—
albeit reluctantly—rather than withdrawing from it” (p.751).  
The threat posed by an outgroup to an ingroup tends to be uncertain, long lasting, and future-oriented, that 
is, the emotional reaction to outgroup threat is more likely to be anxiety than fear. Perhaps fear is more 
common at the individual level, whereas anxiety is more common via identification, at least identification 
with a group. 
The fact that we slide easily into using the same name—anger-- for the emotion corresponding to 
appraisal of insult at three levels--personal, individual-identification, and group-identification—does not 
settle the issue. The same issue can be raised for other examples of intergroup emotions: pride, joy, 
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sadness, disgust. For each emotion we can ask whether it is experienced the same at each of the three 
levels. Here is a place where physiological and brain-scan measures might help us toward an answer. 
The Power of Pollution 
In the section on Negative Essence, I suggested that there may be something special about the threat of 
contamination and pollution. Material threat, status threat and existential threat do not have a special 
vocabulary of animal epithets; contamination threat does.  These epithets—the enemy are a virus, they are 
lice, they are cockroaches, they are pigs—convey contamination and disgust. That is, these names convey 
not just inferior essence but rotten, disgusting essence. 
Research has begun to study disgust reactions in the context of intergroup relations, including issues of 
prejudice, discrimination, and intergroup violence (Rozin, Haidt, and McCauley, 2016, p.p. 826-827).  
Maoz & McCauley (2008) showed that measures of disgust and contempt toward Palestinians predicted 
Jewish support for annexing the territories and transferring Palestinians to Arab states. Disgust and 
contempt predicted support for transfer beyond what perceived threat could predict. 
The suggestion here is that all bad essences are not alike, and that perception of a disgusting and 
contaminating bad essence is a particularly powerful incitement and rationalization for violence against 
those with this kind of bad essence—both individuals and groups. This suggestion could lead to research 
testing whether perception of a contaminating bad essence may be the most dangerous form of 
dehumanization. 
Relation of Hate and Love 
There are several research issues that arise most clearly when considering hate and love together. First are 
issues raised by definitions of hate and love that compete with the stipulated definitions advanced here, 
and second are issues raised by considering examples of hate and love in intergroup conflict.  
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In her definition of love, Fredrickson (2016) sees love-the-emotion as a moment of positivity resonance, 
in which two or more individuals share positive emotion, mutual caring, and behavioral synchrony. It is 
difficult to see how this definition of love can be extended to the group level. What would momentary 
behavioral synchrony mean in relation to an ethnic or national group?  In her footnote 2, Frederickson 
suggests that love-the-emotion can spread from dyads to crowds and communities; this suggestion points 
toward research that might distinguish love-as-emotion from love as positive identification.  
In their definition of hate, Fischer, Halperin, Canetti, and Jasini (2018) distinguish two kinds of hate, 
chronic and momentary. Chronic hate is seen as disposition rather than emotion. “[Chronic h]ate is based 
on perceptions of a stable, negative disposition of persons or groups. We hate persons and groups more 
because of who they are, than because of what they do” (p.309). Momentary hate is seen as an emotion. 
“The emotion hate (also referred to as “immediate hate”…) is much more urgent and occurs in response 
to significant events that are appraised as so dramatic that they lead to the kind of appraisals (e.g., “the 
outgroup is evil by nature”) and motivations (e.g., “I would like it to be destroyed”) that are usually 
associated with hatred.” 
As described by Fischer et al (2018), chronic hate appears to be equivalent to negative identification that 
includes perception of a bad essence (“more because of who they are..”), except that Fischer et al do not 
make explicit reference to a bad essence. But it is not clear what to make of the emotion hate (“immediate 
hate”) asserted to occur in response to events leading to the perception that “the outgroup is evil by 
nature.” It seems that perception of bad essence is part of both chronic hate the disposition and immediate 
hate the emotion. To make sense of this formulation, research might try to show that the difference 
between chronic hate and emotion hate is when hate begins. Perhaps some individuals had hate (negative 
identification including perception of bad essence) before the dramatic events, and others develop hate 
(perception of bad essence) only in reaction to these events. 
Beyond issues raised by competing definitions, there is a major issue about the extent to which hate and 
love are independent. One possibility is that hate is the reflection of love, an extreme form of negative 
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identification that depends entirely on positive identification. In this case love of individual or ingroup 
comes first, and hate is the consequence of a conflicting relationship between what is loved and what is 
hated. I love my son then I hate anyone who humiliates him. I love my country, then I hate any group that 
threatens us. 
Another possibility is that I hate any individual or group seen to have a bad essence, and this perception 
does not depend on love. Perhaps any individual or group perceived to have a disgusting or polluting 
essence is hated, and the positive and negative emotional consequences of seeing bad and good things 
happen to the hated are engaged without any reference to positive ingroup identification.  
These two possibilities correspond to two views of how ingroup and outgroup are essentialized. If hate is 
derivative of love, then a seeing negative outgroup essence depends on seeing a contrasting positive 
ingroup essence. If hate can be independent of love, then it should be possible to find people who 
perceive an outgroup negative essence but do not perceive a positive ingroup essence.  
Chirot and McCauley (2006) surmised that this combination is unlikely. “The Turk, the German volk, the 
authentic Cambodian or Hutu, the working class—each can be seen to have a positive essence that makes 
it a superior class of people, a chosen people…(p.85). “We suspect that essentializing the enemy is linked 
strongly and even necessarily with essentializing the in-group. … The result of this double essentializing 
is a battle of good and evil, of two incompatible essences in which love of the good means necessarily 
hate for the threatening out-group” (p. 86). Considerable research would be required to test this surmise.  
Individual Differences 
Some individuals may be more likely to hate and love than others. Perhaps some individuals are more 
likely essentialize groups, or individuals, or both. 
More important is the issue raised by Kressel (2002) and by Moshman (2005). Who is doing the hating 
that is associated with mass political murder?  It is easy to assume that hate is what drives the perpetrators 
of murder, but we know that many young men join in mass killing for mundane reasons, such as material 
Essence of Hate and Love   26 
 
gain, status gain, escape, and survival. In case histories of genocide, hate-filled texts are usually from 
elites: Hitler, Pol Pot, transcripts from Radio Television Libre des Milles Collines during the Rwandan 
genocide. Polls assessing mass or population levels of hate are rare. It will be important to learn more 
about the distribution of hate in cases of mass killing and ethnic cleansing. And it will be important to 
avoid assuming that hate is THE cause of mass killing. 
In Conclusion 
This chapter has advanced the possibility that hate and love may usefully be seen as forms of negative and 
positive identification. Negative identification means inverse caring, which brings positive emotions 
when the individual or group hated is failing and negative emotions when the hated is prospering. 
Conversely, positive identification brings positive emotions when the individual or group loved is 
prospering and negative emotions when the loved is failing. Hate and love are proposed as particularly 
powerful forms of identification that occur when identification is joined with perception of an essence-- 
negative essence for hate, positive essence for love.  
Theoretically, the view of love proposed here is consistent with fusion theory, but goes further by 
specifying that fusion depends on perception of a positive essence and by making hate a kind of anti-
fusion. Similarly, the view of love proposed is consistent with intergroup emotions theory, but goes 
further by including identification with individuals as well as groups. Hate as described here is consistent 
with Haslam’s infra-humanization theory of dehumanization, but goes further in suggesting that 
dehumanization sees not just an inferior animal essence but an animal essence that is disgusting and 
contaminating. These theoretical distinctions may be sharpened or blurred by the research directions 
suggested in this section, but the research should in any case enlarge our understanding of the ways that 
humans pour themselves into caring about others. 
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